Tag Archives: economics

Sorry, but Anna Gilmore is still lying about economics

by Carl V Phillips

Anna Gilmore, an anti-tobacco activist and “researcher” at the University of Bath (they must be so proud!) is primarily known for doing junk epidemiology but has also branched into junk economics.  (The definitive collection about her can be found at Chris Snowdon’s blog, running a search for her name.)  It is not entirely clear whether she is in the subset of lairs who know they are disseminating disinformation or the subset who claim to be experts but simply have no idea what they are doing.  My assessment, based on her previous foray into economics (see my analysis of it) is that while she seems to be intentionally misleading about epidemiology, in economics she probably never read so much as a first-semester textbook before writing her unintentional comedy.

Her new “contribution” is “Understanding tobacco industry pricing strategy
and whether it undermines tobacco tax policy: the example of the UK cigarette market, by Anna B. Gilmore, Behrooz Tavakoly, Gordon Taylor, Howard Reed, about the impact of cigarette tax increases on retail prices.  It was widely laughed at by commentators because the part of her press release that was usually highlighted in the news was that smokers react to price increases by shifting to cheaper products (that is, from premium brands to brands with lower wholesale, and thus after-tax, prices).  The observations were along the lines of “hey, look, Anna Gilmore seems to have learned basic economics!”  But she actually did not.

I do have to give credit to the health reporters on this one.  Not only did they emphasize the one simplistic observation that she got right, but some fixed her false claim “tobacco tax increases are the most effective means of reducing tobacco use” (by “tobacco” she means cigarettes, of course — the standard casual anti-THR lie is thrown in there), making it accurate with “one of the most effective”.  (Basic education about the risks from smoking is, by a huge margin, the most effective way to convince people to not smoke.  Taxes come in third, after promotion of harm reduction.)  Unfortunately, further down in the articles, most of the reporters went on to report her innumerate claims also.

The core of her innumeracy — failure to understand first-semester economics before trying to write about economics — is claiming that the setting new prices after a shock to the market (in this case, a new tax increase) is a matter of complicated volition rather than simple market forces.  She attributes manufacturers’ actions to various nefarious motives, which is perhaps just political lying, but probably is because neither she nor her coauthors understood what they were writing about (and did not stop to think that perhaps University of Bath has an economics department, and that any decent student in it, let alone any professor, could have explained it).

The key is the following observation :  When taxes are increased, the retail price of premium brands increases by more than the tax increase (i.e., there is a wholesale price increase also) while the price of low-end brands increases by less than the tax increase (i.e., there is a wholesale price reduction).  I am going to assume that this simple factual claim was true — not a foregone conclusion due to Gilmore’s history of publishing out-and-out false claims, but since it is exactly what an economist would predict it seems like a safe assumption.

To predict that the manufacturers would lower wholesale prices (i.e., eat some of the tax themselves) on the highly price-competitive cheaper brands is just a matter of applying the most common supply and demand curve analysis (see, e.g., Wikipedia).  When there is an increase in the cost of supply (a tax has exactly the same effect as, say, an increase the price of the tobacco leaf), it is shared between the consumer (higher prices) and supplier (prices not quite so much higher as to fully compensate for the cost increase).  Usually most of the cost is borne by the consumer, but typically not all of it.  Basic stuff.

[For those who want to delve a bit deeper:  The consumer pays most of the cost because the supply curve is much closer to horizontal than in the typical picture like the one in the link.  For those who want to delve even deeper, and to argue that long-run supply curves do not actually slope upward at all, despite the usual picture, it gets a bit more complicated.  We still observe that cost shocks are shared by consumer and supplier.  The easiest explanation is that in a highly price-competitive market, at least one supplier is going to have an upward-sloping short-run demand curve over the relevant range -- because they have already invested the capital in their manufacturing and distribution capacity and so are better off lowering prices to somewhat offset the reduction in demand, just like in the standard graph.  If this is true for even one supplier in the competitive market, the others will also have to lower their prices or lose revenues to the cheaper competitor.]

The extra price increase on premium brands is even easier to explain.  The manufacturer of a premium brand has some “market power” because consumers have loyalty and will not switch to a competitor to save a few pennies (and there are relatively few competitors, so they are all doing it).  This lets the supplier charge more without losing so much business that the reduced quantity erases the increase in net revenues per unit.  The ultimate in market power is a monopoly; with no competitors at all, the only constraint on a monopolist’s prices is consumers reducing their consumption, and so they can command a lot of net revenue per unit.

What happens in a market power situation when there is a cost shock like a tax?  The consumer becomes less sensitive to any given increase in net revenue.  It is easy to see:  Imagine a good with a production cost of $1 that the manufacturer charge $1.20 for because that is the price that maximizes total net revenue; raising the price to $1.21 would drive more than 5% of the customers to cheaper competitors, and so the net effect would be a loss.  Now imagine a new tax of $1 on everyone, including the competitors.  A price rise to $2.20 maintains the old margin, but now an increase to $2.21 is a much smaller change in the base price, and so consumers will react less.  Less than 5% will be lost due to such an increase, but the impact on the supplier (making an additional 5% cent per unit) is still exactly the same, so the additional increase is a good idea.  So it is perfectly predictable that a tax increase would lead to an additional wholesale price increase.  (Note that the total net revenue of the supplier might still drop due to the reduced demand that the big price increase causes, but this does not affect how to optimize the situation as it is.)

Snowdon discovered that Gilmore’s close allies have been failing to understand this since at least 2008:

“The hypocrisy of the industry knows no bounds,” said Deborah Arnott, the director of Action on Smoking and Health. “While complaining bitterly about tax increases, these companies have been raising the price of cigarettes to fill their own coffers while hiding behind the screen of tax rises.”

Undoubtedly in the last five years, in response to such silly claims, someone explained the basic economics to them.  Of course manufacturers do not like tax increases — they decrease demand.  Of course they raise their prices (on premium brands) when there is such an increase — it only takes the two paragraphs above to explain why.  So perhaps the current claims are intentional disinformation rather than mere unforgivable ignorance after all.

It is hard to tell exactly what they want people to believe, since it is hard to be precise when arguing nonsense.  But they try to suggest that these simple predictable effects of supply and demand, observed in a market with multiple competitors who want to take business from each other, are some complicated unified plot to manipulate their customers.  Somehow every bit of it, both the competitive price decreases and the premium price increases, is part of a grand scheme to do something other than simply make as much profit as possible given the taxes and what consumers want.

Ah, to have the easy life of working in the tobacco control industry.  Archeology is made much easier if you just take the Jewish Bible as fact and do not have to bother with all of that pesky carbon dating and digging in the ground.  Economics is similarly easy if your bible lets you avoid bothering with all the theory and empirical evidence from economics.

So why did I cover this junk science about cigarettes in the anti-THR lies blog?  The answer is that basic economics offers the strongest arguments in favor of THR.  Therefore any attempt to mislead people about the basic economics, and to claim that the tobacco/nicotine market is somehow mysteriously different from markets for all other goods that consumers want, tends to aid the anti-THR agenda.  The main message of this analysis is that the market was working just like it does for any other consumer good, with price changes reflecting exactly the same profit-maximizing forces that we would expect in normal consumer markets for phones or almonds or coffee.

So long as we get the economics right, the case for THR is even stronger than the usual arguments that are based on health effects alone.  More about that soon when I widely release the paper that I am now circulating.

Phillips testimony for FDA hearing on recognizing tobacco harm reduction

by Carl V Phillips

The title overstates a bit, but next week’s FDA hearings (official government announcement here) on whether to allow pharma nicotine products to be able to officially (“on label”) be used for long-term THR rather than just for the magical rapid weaning off of nicotine that they are supposed to accomplish.  Since they are approximately useless for the latter and are mostly used for the former anyway, this is not a huge stretch.  But recognizing the reality of THR would be a big step for the FDA, similar to what the UK’s MHRA has already done.

FDA is not really admitting that this opens the door to properly recognizing THR, but it does, and so several of us who are interested in THR are testifying on various points.  Annoyingly, the government wanted us to submit not just our slides, but an actual text of our statements a week in advance.  There are various conspiracy theories about the reason for that, but mostly I just find it a bother since I never write out the text of my talks, but usually put a lot of detail in the slides.  But since I had to do it, I might as well make use of it here, so….

Testimony for: FDA Actions Related to Nicotine Replacement Therapies and Smoking Cessation Products; Report to Congress on Innovative Products and Treatments for Tobacco Dependence; Public Hearing

by Carl V Phillips PhD

17 December 2012; Silver Spring, Maryland

I am testifying as a private citizen and stakeholder, speaking for myself based on extensive professional experience and expertise.  I am a long-time advocate and researcher on tobacco harm reduction.  I have worked in this field for more than a decade as a researcher and educator, and have published roughly a million words on the topic.  I am also an informed, consciously-motivated, occasional user of low-risk tobacco products, which I find to be quite beneficial, and clearly worth the unmeasurably small risk that they pose.

In response to Question 4.4, which asks about identifying harm in this context and identifying which harms are of particular importance, I have the following observations:

[Note:  Full text is: 4.4. With regard to innovative products and treatments for ``reduction in the harm associated with continued tobacco use'': a. How should the ``harm'' be identified and measured? b. Is there a range of harms that might be addressed, and if so, which are the most important to address?]

Harm should refer to actual harmful effects.  This seems rather obviously, but there is a remarkable failure to follow this guideline in the discourse on this issue.  Life-threatening disease risk is an important harm.  Immediate problems of functioning are also an important harm.  “Addiction” is not a harm in itself (even setting aside that it is not even scientifically defined).  It might be a reason that people do something that actually causes harm, but it is only that actual harm that should be counted.

“Harm” must be considered in net term, as is done for treatment drugs or anything else the government properly regulates.  Nothing is harm-free, but harm may be low (or trivial) compared to benefits.  The common approach of naïve extremist activists approach, saying “this has a harm and therefore is bad” makes terrible public policy, but that is what you get if you do not consider full net costs and benefits.

To consider net effects, first requires considering the health benefits of using a tobacco harm reduction (THR) product as compared to abstinence.  There are psychological benefits and aids to basic functioning from nicotine use for a non-trivial minority of the population, and this is a highly important consideration.  Second, the net must consider health benefits that may not be considered “health”.  Acting as if nicotine is purely a treatment for disease, rather than recognizing it as a consumer good that serves other preferences, is simply out of touch with the obvious reality.  Many people use nicotine because they like the effects, and this is another highly important consideration.  If the “D” side of FDA are not accustomed to dealing with such goods, perhaps those on the “F” side could help (or anyone else in government who regulates any non-drug consumer goods).

Third, net health benefits need to based on the probability-weighted “but for” choices.  For example, if there is a 20% chance someone would be abstinent, but for the promotion of the THR option, and 80% they would continue smoke, then you need to compare any harms from the THR to .8 times the risk of smoking (a comparison that overwhelmingly favors the latter).  It is simply out-and-out wrong thinking to compare the harm from one option to some unrealistic world that some people consider a best-case.  This is not an odd concept: treatment drugs are evaluated based on their net effects, considering the harm from not getting the treatment.  Moreover, the calculation of the net harm needs to recognize that some of the methods for pursuing abstinence (e.g., Chantix) are quite hazardous in themselves.  And, most important, if someone tries to achieve abstinence but relapsing for a while, and as a result smokes for just a couple of more months, the resulting risk is (for the average smoker) greater than from than using a low-risk alternative for a lifetime, as I argued in my 2009 Harm Reduction Journal paper.  This means that pursuit of abstinence is often a higher risk alternative to THR.

In response to Question 4.6, which asks about how FDA and other HHS agencies can help promote public health in this context,…

[Full text: 4.6 In regulating the innovative products and treatments referenced in section 918(b), how can FDA and other HHS Agencies act to ensure that the three effects mentioned in section 918(b)--total abstinence from tobacco use, reductions in consumption of tobacco, and reductions in the harm associated with continued tobacco use--are achieved as broader outcomes, in a manner that best protects and promotes the public health?]

…far and away the most important thing to do is:

Stop lying!

Units of HHS are the world’s biggest anti-THR liars, and have been since I started documenting anti-THR disinformation campaigns about a decade ago.  The pervasive message to smokers about low risk tobacco and nicotine alternatives coming out of HHS has been and still is “you might as well smoke” (a phrase that was the title of my 2005 BMC Public Health paper that reports some of my research on this disinformation).  FDA has now joined other agencies in publishing disinformation designed to discourage smokers from switching to low-risk alternatives by grossly exaggerating the risks of those alternatives using false and intentionally misleading claims.

These anti-THR messages encourage people to smoke when they would otherwise use a smoke-free alternative that poses risks that are two orders of magnitude lower.  No conceivable amount of low-risk product usage could cause as much health harm as the smoking this causes.  Following the phrases from Question 4.6, respectively “total abstinence from tobacco use” and “reductions in the harm associated with continued tobacco use”, the current practice of promoting the former at the expense of encouraging the latter is guaranteed to be bad for public health.  Obvious and simple arithmetic makes that clear.

Regarding Question 4.7, about what to consider in FDA’s premarket evaluation of new product candidates,…

[Full text: 4.7. How can these broader outcomes be taken into account in FDA's premarket evaluation of new product candidates?]

…I reiterate that focusing on the net on smoking is most important.  Indeed, from a population health perspective, it is the only thing that matters.  Everything else is a rounding error.

In addition, premarket evaluation depends on having a correct basic model for what motivates consumers to choose particular products.  People act based on incentives which include health risks, of course, but also include many other factors.  Consumers making choices are not mere patients – sick people seeking treatment for a disease and nothing more.  If they are treated as such when predicting what they will do, the predictions will inevitably be wrong.  Even worse, if they are just treated as black boxes who are assumed to just make choices at particular rates because that is sort of what other consumers did in the past under difference circumstances, then you will have garbage in yielding garbage out.

I have a lot more to say about this, but only seven minutes total, so that is where I will end.

Fundamental lie: tobacco has no benefits, only marketing

by Carl V Phillips

The ANTZ often appeal to the “think of the children” argument.  But when they say that, what they are not saying is that they consider all tobacco and nicotine users to be children.  And not just children, but either mere toddlers or children who have not been raised in a commercial culture where merchants try to tout their wares and the rest of us work hard to ignore them (which is to say, they were somehow not raised in any post-agrarian human culture).  This is the only possible interpretation of their persistent claim that marketing by merchants is the reason that people use tobacco products.  It is a fundamental anti-THR lie because if there are actually no benefits, then it must be that everyone really wants to become abstinent, so there is no value in THR.

Yesterday, Brad Rodu posted a great analysis of the actual evidence about tobacco advertising and consumption in the US.  He notes that the persistent lie is backed by no evidence and goes on to present some of the evidence that affirmatively argues against it.  This begins with the observation that tobacco use was popular long before there was a marketing effort as well as the fact that Sweden (with a complete tobacco advertising ban) has usage levels that are similar to other rich countries.  His new analysis points out recent US Federal Trade Commission reports that show there is a strong correlation between advertising expenditures and changes in smoking.  A strong inverse (negative) correlation, that is:  advertising expenditures increased as total consumption decreased.

Of course, the ANTZ have a response to that:  Due to their own terribly impressive anti-smoking efforts (i.e., telling people smoking was unhealthy four decades ago and waiting for the obvious effect, plus a little fiddling around the margins) the cigarette companies were desperately spending on advertising to try to counter their efforts.  Indeed, Rodu partially concurs with that, suggesting that the sharp drop in advertising after 2004 was the result of the companies giving up on what they had discovered to be a futile effort.

But assuming that is true, it is clear evidence that the main conclusion (that marketing is the primary or only cause of consumption) is clearly false.  The perception by merchants that they could reverse the slow downward drift in consumption with a massive increase in advertising, even if they were right, would do nothing to support the original lie.  Given that they were wrong, it is affirmative evidence against it.

Further evidence can be found in the increasingly desperate and silly measure that the ANTZ are pursuing to defend it, like insisting that logos on packaging and even the tiny arcane batch identifying codes printed on the cigarette paper are the “advertising” that causes the consumption.  In case it was not clear that the ANTZ were just making this all up, their claim that it was not the glossy magazine ads and billboards (now banned) or television (long banned) or sponsorships that kept 1/5th of the population smoking, it was the three-letter codes printed just above the filter in 4-point type that kept tens of millions enthralled.  If only we had figured that out sooner!  (“Liars” really gives them too much credit sometimes, huh?)

Rodu points out that the situation with smokeless tobacco (again, in the US) is a bit more complicated.  Advertising for snuff/snus did increase at the same time that consumption was increasing.  He points out that snus consumption was increasing at about the same rate that chewing tobacco was decreasing, so that substitution explains a lot of the trend.  What he does not note is the common challenge in analyzing economic data, simultaneity problems.  These are cases where X may affect Y and also Y may affect X, and so it is difficult to measure the independent effects.  In this case, there is no doubt that the increasing popularity of spit-free smokeless tobacco, as people learned about THR and also sought an anywhere anytime alternative, caused more advertising.  Merchants have more incentive to advertise in a larger market, especially one that is emerging and brand loyalty has not yet been established.

Did the advertising also increase consumption of this low-risk alternative to smoking?  Perhaps, and if it did then it provided important public health benefits.  It would be possible to try to estimate how large this effect was, trying to sort out the causation in the other direction and other factors.  But it would require a rather sophisticated analysis that apparently no one has done.  Of course, the ANTZ are not interested in doing honest economic analysis any more than they are doing honest epidemiology.  To them, “science” is a rhetorical tool to be manipulated for activism, not a way to really find things out.  Moreover, as I have pointed out previously, they are clearly incapable of doing even remotely passable economic analysis.

The real economists who worked in tobacco control exited a long time ago.  They have been long-since replaced by people who assume that people pay a very high price for something that has no benefits for them because… er, well, um… Just Because!  Needless to say, sociology and “public health” curricula do not require even freshman-level economics.

StatistiLie – ANTZ cleverly choosing the wrong year to report

posted by Carl V Phillips

Since I am still trying to recover from my travels, though have about ten more complicated posts I want to write, I will temporize again — this time outsourcing the lie of the day to Dick Puddlecote.

He points out how several anti-smoking liars tried to mislead the public by reporting statistics from the wrong years.  In particular, in response to the many recent claims that rising taxes are driving more smokers to the black market and this will continue to increase, they compared two past years instead of the current data.  They cleverly (obviously intentionally) ignored the facts that (a) most of the taxes that inspired the flurry of concern took effect since the period they report and (b) there are newer statistics available — and indeed even reported in the newspaper.  It will come as no surprise that the ANTZ concluded that their taxes do not drive people to the black market, but the new statistics support the opposite conclusions.

It is even a bit worse than that, so I recommend you read the whole thing.

Though this is about cigarettes, it is very much an anti-THR lie.  It touches on both of the fundamental lies of anti-THR.  It implies that tobacco/nicotine use is somehow so unlike every other consumption choice that consumers will not behave rationally.  That is, unlike what economics tells us about …well, about every choice people make, for some mysterious reason, tobacco consumers will not gravitate toward low-cost competitors when someone increases prices.  If you can be tricked into believing that, then you can be tricked into other departures from the obvious simple economics, like believing that people who choose to consume nicotine/tobacco do not really get any benefit from that choice.  Thus, the lie goes, there is no value in THR because no one really wants to be consuming these products rather than being abstinent.

In addition, the absurd claim that consumers will not shift toward the black market means that taxes can be raised, without bound, and smokers will respond only by quitting.  (Note that a ban is basically an attempt to raise the tax to infinity, though incomplete enforcement means that it is always actually finite.  Thus, punitive taxes are effectively partial bans.)  For any other good, a ban or price increase will cause substitute markets — in particular, black market supply chains — to gain market share.  But if smokers are the exception to that, and will just obey like they are supposed to, then universal cessation is just a few tax increases away.  And so, their lie goes, there is no reason to pursue THR.

I am adding the new tag to this blog, statistiLie, to try to identify lies that are based on intentionally using the wrong statistics.  (As always, keeping in mind that when an author knows so little that he does not know a claim is wrong, it does not change the existence of the lie, but merely its nature.  An author who unintentionally uses clearly wrong statistics is lying about his knowledge.)  A large portion of all anti-THR lies involve statistics, of course.  I will try to reserve this for the particular case when it is clear that there are statistics that are useful for addressing a particular point, but other numbers are chosen instead, and moreover that the author hides the existence of the more useful numbers.

I did not want to merely use the tag “statistics” because too many people observe that statistics are used to lie and jump to the conclusion that those quoting statistics should not be trusted.  But statistics are the only way we move toward the truth in these matters, and I want to push back against this sullying of the word.  It is interesting to note that in this case that the ANTZ were claiming that the various commentators who based their conclusions on the right statistics were lying.  There is a danger that the real liars will accuse someone else of lying with statistics; indeed, it is a typical ploy by the liars.

Finally, it is useful to note that some anti-smoking lies are pro-THR (e.g., exaggerations of the risk from ETS) — still lies with everything that implies, but they do tend to encourage THR rather than discouraging.  But the statistiLies about the economics (black markets, plain packaging, advertising, bans, etc.) very often try to support the core anti-THR assumptions.  Thus, those lies about smoking turn out to be an anti-THR issue.